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perspective of ethics and literary theory 
 
‘… while the others talked on and he talked on himself, he tried as he did everywhere and always to 
imagine the inner, transparent motion of this or that other person. He would carefully seat himself 
inside the interlocutor as in an armchair, so that the other’s elbows would serve as armrests for him, 
and his soul would fit snugly into the other’s soul…’ 
Vladimir Nabokov, The Gift  
 
The world of searching for reasons of ethically questionable actions appears to 
relentlessly inspire the search for the sources of enhancing moral thinking. One of the 
common ethical questions is why humans are morally good, yet more interestingly: why are 
we able to be deliberately cruel? The mutual interest between the fields of philosophy and 
literary studies leads to a further question: would we choose to be benevolent, helpful rather 
than harmful if we read fine literature? For centuries, ethics and literature have remained in 
epistemological and normative relations, mutually facilitating the cognition and illustration of 
certain moral values. Especially, the contemporary philosophy of literature and ethical 
criticism contribute to the debate on the influence of reading on moral decision-making 
process and human flourishing. Still, the debate seems to be an ongoing process, which leaves 
many questions open. In an attempt to give a plausible answer the above question, I’d like to 
confront the way the content-form-ethics relationship is assumed to function and suggest an 
alternative justification of such a relation. I reach for the notions from the domain of 
epistemology, aesthetics and ethics. The thesis on the moral aspect of literature is defendable 
with reference to the concept of detachment, or transcending towards the other, stemming 
from the moral sense theory. The notion of detachment introduced into the field of ethical 
criticism could be named the poetics of transcending. My analysis tries to show that 
detachment and perspective change is a condition of moral judgment, which enables moral 
understanding both of oneself and the other. On the basis of this statement, a complementary 
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claim further proposes that literature may aid the strategy of detachment and that developed 
literary imagination enriches individual moral sense. 
 Art might be considered as a source of normativity under the assumption of it being in 
a sense useful, applicable for ethical considerations, and hence, having a particular didactic or 
obliging function. On the other hand, products of art can be seen as devoid of normative 
factors whatsoever. The two views build a tension of the ancient/modern, normative/neutral, 
useful/for-its-sake oppositions of equally justified reasoning. In the present account, 
literariness – as a particular form of art – will be given attention under ethical consideration. 
Literariness in the genre of a novel can be taken under examination as an aesthetic object, so 
as to specify the possible extent to which it can be considered in terms of ethics. Literature 
and ethics – compared with the pair of notions of form and content – have been viewed as 
inseparable, i.e. literature is assumed to have influence on moral choices of the audience1. 
Following this line of thought, one is not supposed to talk either about literature or about 
ethics, since – just like form and content – considering them separately does not make sense. 
This statement is a travesty of the long functioning claim of literary theory: we cannot talk 
about form as detached from content, since form is content and we can only talk about 
structure2. Form is the function of structure; content cannot get changed without the change 
in form. Such argumentation triggers a question: how are philosophers justified to travesty the 
claim on the aspects of literary structure in their claim combining two, seemingly different, 
branches of human thought? What brings literature – a form of art, the narrative, imaginative 
– close to theoretical, rational, normative ethics?        
One objection I’d like to make is directed towards theories, which treat literature as an 
illustration of certain philosophical and ethical concepts, or taking a literary theme as a guide, 
motivation for the reader’s action3 . For instance, literary depiction is supposed to direct 
                                                 
1 Cf.: Martha Nussbaum, ‘Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature’, in: Love’s Knowledge: Essays on 
Philosophy and Literature, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 3-53. 
2  After the poetics of structuralism, elucidated among others by Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics. 
Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature, London: Routledge, 2002. 
3
 Especially widespread in neo-Aristotelianism, for example: Anthony Cunningham, The Heart of What Matters. 
The Role of Literature in Moral Philosophy, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2001. The 
story, or the ‘aboutness’ of a novel is assumed to have influence on the evaluation of certain aspects in human 
life, like emotional attachments, e.g. Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Remains of the Day and Toni Morrison’s Beloved are 
supposed to show that the absence of passion and human intimacy leads to moral blindness, or Zora Neal 
Hurston’s Seraph on the Suwanee – to show the interdependencies between ‘good character’ and vulnerability.  
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readers ‘to what should rightly command our attention. By reading the right kinds of novels in 
the right way, we can literally read for life, thereby honing our capacity to see clearly and 
choose wisely when it comes to real life’ (Cunningham, p.3). This view is shared by Richard 
Rorty and Martha Nussbaum
4
. Rorty’s philosophy concerning the postulate of replacing 
theory with narrative form states that reading of novels relates to the claim that topics of 
political justice can be treated more effectively in works of literature than in philosophical 
treatises. The account reviews the notions of contingency, linked to the philosopher’s 
foregoing claims in the philosophy of language, and liberal ironism which may lead to 
reviewed understanding of the idea of human solidarity. Narrative description is assumed to 
be a condition of essential empathy with other human beings, especially within the genre of a 
novel. Vladimir Nabokov and George Orwell are brought as a narrative exemplification of the 
study on individual and social practice of cruelty. Re-description is the crucial element of 
literary reading in terms of enhanced sensitivity to the suffering of other human beings, 
attainable through the literature classified and analyzed as describing cruelty. The idea behind 
Nussbaum’s work is to show literature as having impact on the development of moral 
judgment within the practice of law. It reveals how a certain type of narrative literature 
expresses and develops a conception of humanistic public reasoning, and what benefits this 
conception might offer for the public sphere. However, what my analysis focuses on is the 
connection which the philosopher traces between literary imagination and both compassion 
and mercy. According to Nussbaum, literary works – especially novels and poetry – have a 
unique contribution to our imagination, emotions and consequently to our moral judgments. 
Literary readership is assumed to develop a reader’s imagination and to give emotional 
experience which is crucial for the enhancement of one’s moral sensitivity. Good literature is 
disturbing – in opposition to purely scientific texts – it evokes powerful emotions, disconcerts. 
The role of imagination is also enriched by poetry, by metaphorical way of thinking, which 
the author calls fancy. It is the ability to see one thing in another, a perception which is 
pointing to something beyond itself, seeing in the things that are perceptible other things that 
are not before one’s eyes. The philosopher brings the statement to the conclusion that there is 
a kind of charity in this willingness to go beyond the evidence in perception, and this charity 
is a preparation for greater charities in life.  
                                                 
4
 See the focal works devoted to literature: Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989. The work of Martha Nussbaum is in a large part devoted to literary criticism 
(e.g. Love’s Knowledge: Essays in Philosophy and Literature, 1990), however the main claim can be found in: 
Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life, Boston: Beacon Press, 1995. 
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As far as the mentioned theories can constitute a basis for further study, I would like 
to, however, point out that they promote certain inconsistencies. The theories seem to 
intermingle different approaches to literature, as in the analysis of the relationship between a 
narrative and a narratee – when Nussbaum treats reading as experiencing the possible and 
Rorty classifies literature according to the ‘books which talk about’ certain ethical problems – 
with the analysis of particular levels of a novel’s structure, i.e. the plot5. As opposed to that, 
the emphasis of the present account is placed on the fact that, while analyzing certain levels of 
literary structure, one should focus on a more theoretical approach to a literary text and 
eschew to trace possible influences that the story of such a text in itself may have on the 
implied reader in terms of ‘what it is about’ and how it may ‘influence the reader’s ethical 
choices’. It is firmly intended here to defend a view that such statements may belong merely 
to the category of intuitions, and thus may leave too great a room for mistaken speculation. 
Aspects like, for instance, irony, criticism, or persuasion, concerning that which comes from 
the reality outside the text, should not belong to the realm of ethical criticism. One may 
consider an example of literature depicting immoral behaviour, just to mention Jonathan 
Littel’s The Kindly Ones, Bret Easton Ellis’ American Psycho, or Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita, 
in order to defend my statement. The themes and main characters presented there may in no 
way provide moral guidance to their readers.    
Answering the question of a possible relation between literary structure-ethics is a 
starting point to more basic consideration, namely that of the relationship between a reader 
and a literary text, and the possibility which it offers of attaining greater moral awareness. My 
proposal is left with a possibility of an approach to particular levels of narrative structure, the 
consideration of its aesthetic effect on the narratee and possible justification of its moral 
aspects. The aim should be to further examine the following questions: how actually being 
exposed to a novel makes the reader identify with the characters? And why this poetic 
experience could possibly lead to moral enhancement of an individual? What should undergo 
further scrutiny is a possible parallel between the aesthetic- and moral experience. In that 
case, special attention ought to be paid to the process through which the very bond of 
identification and sympathy is created between the characters and the implied reader, to the 
very aspect of reading, which makes the reader situate herself elsewhere – in the fictional 
reality.  
                                                 
5
 For instance, pointing at the ironic themes which ridicule utilitarian views in Charles Dickens’ works, which 
are supposed to serve the development of a reader’s critical thinking. 
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In this point, the epistemological internality-externality debate and the problem of 
perspective with its role in ethics seems to be a relevant reference. Let us take Thomas Nagel
6
 
and the problem of combining perspectives of the particular with the perspective of the whole, 
for he sees it as ‘a problem that faces every creature with the impulse and capacity to 
transcend its particular point of view and to conceive of the world as a whole’ (Nagel, p.4). It 
is claimed that the issue includes, among others, the aspect of morality and affects the 
conception of ourselves and our relations with others. The possibility of taking each of the 
standpoints into account is the fundamental question, and the philosopher defends the 
possibility of treating the perspectives as inseparable, which is necessary for his consideration 
of the normative question, desires, values and obligation. The relation between intentionality 
and various reasons of our action are considered as inseparable from the perspective of 
viewing it. My proposal relies on Nagel’s statement on the very ability to transcend, on the 
shifting of perspectives and its consequences for moral judgment. In his view of both 
consequentialist and deontological ethics, Nagel shows that an objective view, coming ‘from 
nowhere’ within the world goes too far in the pursuit of objectivity; one act viewed from two 
perspectives may possess quite different quality. I agree that any viewing is principally never 
from nowhere, but from beyond – it includes both the view and the viewer.  
The border between the transcending self and the other can be recognized, however, 
moral judgment could not do without understanding through the act of detachment. Morality 
requires the view of transcending of oneself, and the appropriate moral understanding of the 
other requires the ability to enter their situation, or mind. The last requirement, as I suggest, 
can be fulfilled through the practice of reading literary texts, which allows the implied reader 
to enter the minds of fictional characters. The suggestion of the view from beyond is a 
tentative polemic with the view from ‘nowhere’, since the notion of going beyond, of viewing 
from beyond seems to grasp nuances of the subjectivity/objectivity relationship. Eventually, it 
is strongly desired here to introduce this concept on the ground of philosophical inquiry and 
make it applicable for an analysis of literary works.   
Considering these, I attempt to defend the thesis that detachment, change of 
perspective of viewing is a condition of moral judgment, which enables moral understanding 
both of oneself and the other. On the basis of this statement, a complementary claim further 
                                                 
6
 See: Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. The philosopher’s 
claims on the subjectivity-objectivity problem are given special attention, with an intentional omission of the 
author’s consideration of the normative question in ethics, since the study is intended to treat the theme in 
descriptive terms. 
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proposes that literature may aid the strategy of detachment. I shall propose that reading 
literary texts as such develops one’s moral sense because it facilitates the pursuit of 
perspective change. The process of reading brings the implied reader to the state in which one 
experiences the possible, one imaginatively detaches from one’s environment and enters the 
fictional reality, transcends towards the fictional other. The ability of ‘fancy’, imagining the 
possible, may be treated in terms of transcending – trespassing the border between oneself and 
fictional reality – which in this way becomes a condition of moral sensitivization, as well as 
of self-viewing from the standpoint of the other.  
It ought to be added that the present account aims to treat literature and its relation to 
ethics only in descriptive terms. Though, on the other hand, it is difficult to escape the 
normative question connected with literature if it can be justified to have a moral value for the 
reader. Considering its value would inescapably be followed by considering its utility, and 
then the account enters the ground of normative ethics, where we can talk about the reasons to 
promote literature for the common good. Still, it ought to be admitted that such analysis lies 
beyond the scope of this study, and may only be touched upon in the remarks about aesthetics 
and literary text as an obliging form of art
7
, or in connection to the notion of value and 
aesthetic experience in literature as considered, for instance, by Peter Lamarque
8
.       
In order to examine and justify the possible parallel between the aesthetic- and the 
moral experience, I shall refer to classical ethical theories which discuss the idea of 
detachment, or transcending. The notion of sympathy and the accompanying perspective 
change can be brought to attention while comparing the narrative experience of reading with 
the experience of moral judgment. The moral sense and communication of sentiments theory 
by David Hume
9
, the theory of moral sentiments interpreted under the focus on self-viewing 
as mediated through the impartial spectatorship by Adam Smith
10
, complemented by an 
                                                 
7
 This statement opposes the one defended by most philosophical approaches to literature, especially that by 
Martha Nussbaum in her defence of literature’s role for the moral development and grasping of the idea of 
justice on the level of society. It does not state pretensions to any such far-reaching pragmatic effects.  
8
 See: Peter Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature, Blackwell, Oxford: 2009. 
9
 The theory developed in: David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. 
Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978; and Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and 
Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975. 
10
 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, New York: Prometeus Books, 2000. Sympathy discussed in the 
context of the sense of merit (an indirect sympathy with the gratitude of those who receive the benefit from 
someone else’s action). 
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indication of the way it has reached the highest moral relevance together with the notion of 
sympathy and the effacing horizons of the self- and the other-experience (Einsfühlung) 
propounded by Max Scheler
11
, may consititute a basis for my justification, since what they 
have in common is the changing point of view as a condition of moral judgment. Also, 
Immanuel Kant’s theoretical concept of sensus communis, which takes thinking from the 
position of the other as a condition of aesthetic judgment
12
 supports the claim about the 
indispensability of the procedure of transcending of oneself for the aesthetic, as well as moral 
experience and judging. The notion of sympathy, the ‘fellow-feeling’, is treated as an 
important sentiment which enables one to empathize with the other. Impartial spectator is the 
idea, through which the optimal moral judgment is explicated. The impartial observation 
comes from a third person, who is detached and shares no interests with either of the parties 
involved. I shall point out that the sympathy of the observer is grounded on the ability to 
imagine oneself in the situation of the other, the ability to step into the other experience. This 
sympathy can be gained through the process in which imagination plays a crucial role; the 
willingness to imaginatively obtain the same state as the observed leads to the experiencing of 
the other. It may be treated as a special attempt of merging the boundaries of each other’s 
experience. The attempt of fellow-feeling is also proposed in another case, in which, for 
instance Smith describes the possibility of a person’s sympathizing with an impartial 
spectator’s feelings about oneself, which may be treated as the viewing of oneself from the 
perspective of a possible, imaginary observer. This change of perspective implies an activity 
which, on the side of the observed, means relinquishing one’s perspective, an ability to look 
at oneself from an observer’s point of view; that may be treated as detachment from oneself, 
which enables one to accomplish moral judgment over oneself. Thus, Smith’s and Scheler’s 
theories can serve the support of further argument on the ground of literary criticism.  
As for the notion of literariness, let me make a few remarks regarding theoretical 
framework of literary criticism, on which an analysis of literary works ought to be based in 
my view. It derives from the one propounded in structuralism, after theoreticians like Victor 
Shklovsky, Roman Jacobson, reviewed among other by Jonathan Culler, Stephen Hawkes and 
Andrzej Zgorzelski. According to the definition of literariness, which derives from Jacobson’s 
theory of language, literary text is the one in which poetic function prevails. The theory of 
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 See: Max Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, Francke, Bern: 1974.  
12
 See: Immanuel Kant, § 40. ‘Vom Geschmacke als Einer Art von Sensus Communis’, in: Kritik der 
Urteilskraft, ed. by W. Weischedel, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main: 1974.  
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language and communication has led to the definition bridged between formalism and 
structuralism, which states that literary text draws attention to itself, and does not refer to any 
reality beyond itself
13
; following this claim, tracing relationships between the content of 
fictional reality and its possible use or influence for the reality surrounding the implied reader 
should be avoided. Therefore, I claim that an ethical-critical analysis should consider texts as 
they draw our attention to their structure, and in which the predominating poetic function 
evokes a certain aesthetic experience. The analysis of selected works ought to be structural, 
since every literary text creates its ‘supercode’ and constitutes a ‘structure’, and as it has been 
proposed, form and content have to be treated as one while analyzing the structure of a 
literary text
14
. That is why a possibly optimal ethical-critical approach should embrace the 
following levels of the structure: narration techniques, point of view, characterization 
(presentation of fictional characters) and fictional time, and treat them as meaningful and 
contributing to the passing of information about the fictional reality of a work as a whole. 
The concept of detachment introduced into the field of literary studies may constitute a 
mode of reconstructing a literary work, and thus be named as the poetics of transcending. 
Therefore, the poetics combines the findings of narrative theory with the idea of the act of 
transcending as depicted through certain aspects of a narrative structure. Introduction of the 
poetics of transcending as a mode of analysis may reveal that not only the structural levels, 
but also a theme of a literary work itself reflects this strategy. The thesis here is that the 
poetics is signalled at the level of narration, as well as it constitutes one of the rules governing 
the fictional reality and the particular supercode of a literary text. The idea is put forth with 
the intent to suggest a direction, among many other possible directions, a way of reading 
literary texts as articulating the idea through their textual strategies. 
The analysis of literary works which is claimed for here should serve to show literary 
illustration of the strategy of detachment. The implied reader enters the character’s minds and 
identifies with their experiences. Consequently, the pursuit of abandoning one’s perspective 
and sympathizing with the other enhances the reader’s ability of moral judgment. The reader 
also shares with the novel’s characters the experience of transcending and looking at oneself, 
thus developing the ability for oneself. Having considered the aspects of moral judgment as 
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 Cf: T. Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics, London: Methuen, 1985, p. 86. 
14
 ‘A new supercode is created for the use of a single literary text and an addressee is required to reconstruct the 
rules of its additional organization (the supercode) directly from the text. Structure is a phenomenon built of 
interrelated elements that is not equal to a simple sum of its parts, but constitutes a new self-sufficient and 
functional whole.’ After: W. Krajka, A. Zgorzelski, On the Analysis of a Literary Text, PWN, Warsaw: 1984, p.  
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compatible with the literary structure, according to the poetics of transcending, I further 
suggest that novels can be considered as those which hold the limited point of view and those 
with unlimited point of view, treating them as promoting the strategy of transcending or 
containing the failure of transcending respectively. Therefore, one of the claims is that the 
poetics of transcending is the governing rule in, for example, selected modernist works like 
To the Lighthouse by Virginia Woolf, or As I Lay Dying by William Faulkner, as they 
epitomize the notion with their experimental character, while attempting to give fidelity to 
human internal world and the point of view merging between the characters and the narrator 
who has access to their minds. It is also relevant for those texts in the structure of which it is 
not possible to reconstruct the aspect of detachment and changing perspective. Thus, the case 
where narration techniques exclude the shifting point of view and present only a limited one, 
where the characterization does not contain changing perspectives, can be categorized under 
the notion of the failure of transcending. Under this category fall Faulkner’s Rose for Emily 
with the narrator’s limited knowledge, or the novels like The Golden Bowl by Henry James 
with its omniscient narrator who does not reveal all his knowledge, Lolita by Vladimir 
Nabokov with the narrator’s point of view limited to that of one main character of Humbert 
Humbert, as ignoring the point of view of his victim Dolores.   
The reference to the condition of moral judgment – which is assumed to consist in 
thinking from a changed perspective – serves to defend the claim which can be plausibly 
justified about the moral aspect of literature: that it may be a ground on which one can 
practice the viewing of the other and oneself through the shifting perspective. And thus, the 
only feasible effect for the reader in the reality outside the text is the developed ability of 
moral judgment. Another arising issue is the notion of motivation. Consideration of the effect 
of literature on the reader’s action entails the question of the skill of judgment as having place 
in motivation. Therefore, the effect of literature could be considered as motivation for action 
only if the skill of judgment did have a place in motivation.  
It may be presumed that the approach, after being adequately developed and 
accomplished, will cast a new light on the treatment of literature in philosophy, and that it 
could constitute a plausible argument defending the importance of reading for moral 
enhancement. As a consequence, a claim might be put forward that reading, understood as not 
only experiencing the possible worlds, but also the experience of detachment, brings about a 
special kind of moral elevation, which could be normatively promoted at the social level, and 
thus a better developed social life of humans. If that is conceivable, it would by all means be 






The present account aims to show that transcending towards the other is an immanent 
feature of literary structure and that its reconstruction provides justification for the moral 
aspect of literature. Literariness and the genre of a novel is taken under examination as an 
aesthetic object, so as to specify the possible extent to which it can be considered in terms of 
ethics. The proposed account defends a thesis that literature contains aspects which may have 
implications for the enhancement of individual morality. This can be shown at the level of the 
relationship between a reader and a literary text, and justified with reference to the ethical 
theory of moral sense, particularly through the notions of sympathy and detachment. 
 
 
